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This paper analyzes the joint behavior of international 
capital flows by foreign and domestic agents—gross 
capital flows—over the business cycle and during 
financial crises. The authors show that gross capital 
flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to 
net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, 
domestic agents tend to invest abroad, and vice versa. 
Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical, with foreigners 
investing more in the country and domestic agents 
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investing more abroad during expansions. During crises, 
especially during severe ones, there is retrenchment, that 
is, a reduction in both capital inflows by foreigners and 
capital outflows by domestic agents. This evidence sheds 
light on the nature of shocks driving capital flows and 
helps discriminate among existing theories. The findings 
seem consistent with shocks that affect foreign and 
domestic agents asymmetrically, such as sovereign risk 
and asymmetric information. 
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1.  Introduction 
International capital flows have played an increasingly important role in the business cycles of 
developed and developing countries, especially since the 1970s and during episodes of financial 
crises. As a consequence, a large literature has grown, analyzing the cyclical behavior of capital 
flows. The literature has concentrated on studying net capital flows, defined as the difference in 
gross capital flows, that is, the net purchases of domestic assets by foreign agents minus the net 
purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents.
1 The literature shows that net capital flows are 
volatile and pro-cyclical and decline during crisis times. These patterns are more extreme in 
emerging markets and have even motivated the use of the term sudden stops to refer to th e large 
collapses in net capital inflows that often accompany crises.
2 
While net capital flows have concentrated significant attention, much less is known about 
the behavior of gross capital flows.  And yet understanding the behavior of gross capital flows 
seems crucial given that capital flows by foreign and domestic agents are very likely driven by 
different incentives.  For example, agents might invest  directly in a firm located in a foreign 
country if they have access to a technology that is superior to  that of domestic agents, an asset 
might be more attractive for some agents than others if it provides  a better hedge to their non-
pledgeable labor income, and sovereign risk might make the return of  an asset depend on the 
residency of the agent who holds it. As a result, it seems reasonable to expect that gross capital 
flows by foreign and domestic agents behave differently both over the cycle and during crises.
3 
A number of papers  have  analyzed long-run trends in gross capital flows (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2001 and 2007; Kraay et al., 2005, Devereux, 2007, and Gourinchas and Rey, 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés (1995), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Broner and 
Rigobon (2006), Levchenko and Mauro (2007), and Mendoza (forthcoming). 
2 See, for example, Calvo (1998), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2008), and Cavallo and Frankel (2008). 
3 This is indeed what we find, as we explain below . We also find that the importance of gross capital flows has 
increased monotonically since the 1970s to the 2000s. 3 
 
2007a and 2007b).
4 But, surprisingly, there are very few studies on the cyclical behavior of gross 
capital flows. The literature has so far mostly focused on classifying episodes of abrupt reversals 
in capital inflows into those driven by foreign agents, or true sudden stops, and those driven by 
domestic agents, or episodes of capital flight (Faucette, Rothenberg, and Warnock, 2005, Cowan 
et al., 2008, Forbes and Warnock, 2011, and Rothenberg and Warnock, forthcoming). There are 
also a few  studies that typically compare the behavior of  some types of  gross capital flows 
around specific events or in particular countries or assets (Frankel and Schmukler, 1996, Kim 
and Wei, 2002, Dvorak, 2003, Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005, and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010). 
Nevertheless, none of these studies provide a systematic cross -country analysis of the cyclical 
behavior of the different types of gross capital flows  over the business cycle as well as during 
turbulent times. 
Because of the limited research on gross capital flows, many important questions remain 
unanswered. For example, are periods in which foreign agents purchase domestic assets also 
periods in which domestic agents sell foreign assets? Is there a positive or negative correlation 
between capital flows by foreign and domestic agents? What is the behavior of gross capital 
flows over the business cycle and during financial crises? We know that crises are associated 
with reductions  in net capital inflows. But are these reductions on average due to sales of 
domestic assets by foreign agents, purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents, or both? How 
large and how volatile are gross capital flows relative to net capital flows? 
In this paper, we address the type of questions raised above by documenting a number of 
stylized facts about the dynamics of gross capital flows, which shed light on the behavior of 
domestic and foreign agents and the types of shocks underlying international ca pital movement. 
                                                           
4 These studies show that gross capital flows have on average been sizeable, which has resulted in large gross 
international investment positions. 4 
 
This analysis also helps clarify the importance of focusing on gross capital flows as opposed to 
net capital flows. We document these patterns by systematically analyzing the cyclical behavior 
of gross capital flows: the capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and the capital outflows by 
domestic  agents  (COD).  Positive  CIF  and  COD  both  associate  with  increases  in  gross 
international investment positions. To construct CIF and COD, we use balance of payments data 
from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, from 1970 to 2009 
for 103 countries. CIF equals net purchases of domestic assets by non-residents and is thus equal 
to the sum of all liability inflows. COD equals net purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents 
and is thus equal to the negative of the sum of all asset inflows, including international reserves. 
Hence, net capital flows are equal to the difference CIF-COD. 
Our main findings are the following. (i) Over the last four decades, the volatility of gross 
capital flows (CIF and COD) has been large and increasing, especially relative to the much lower 
volatility of net capital flows. This reflects the increasingly positive correlation between CIF and 
COD. (ii) Gross capital flows are pro-cyclical. In other words, during expansions foreign agents 
increase  their  purchases  of  domestic  assets  and  domestic  agents  increase  their  purchases  of 
foreign assets. During crises, especially during severe ones, there is a reduction in gross capital 
flows, with reductions in both CIF and COD. However, CIF tends to fall more during crises as 
these tend to be associated with lower net capital flows. The 2008 financial crisis is a clear 
example of such retrenchment, i.e. a simultaneous decline of both CIF and COD, but we show 
that retrenchment was a feature of previous episodes as well. (iii) A decomposition of gross 
capital flows reveals interesting heterogeneity in the behavior of their components around crises. 
In the case of CIF, its reduction is due to declines in all its components for all country groups. In 
the case of COD for developed countries, its reduction is due to declines in equity, portfolio debt, 5 
 
bank flows, and direct investments, but not in reserves. For developing countries, declines in 
reserves  play  an  important  role  in  accounting  for  the  reduction  in  COD,  but  there  are  also 
significant declines in equity, bank flows, and direct investments. 
The  findings  in  this  paper  have  important  implications  regarding  the  sources  of 
fluctuations in economies open to capital flows. There is a growing literature in international 
macro-finance  that  brings  portfolio  choice  and  asset  pricing  considerations  into  dynamic 
stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  models  of  international  macroeconomics,  with  many 
papers  focusing  on  the  composition  of  countries’  portfolios.  These  models  have  so  far 
emphasized productivity shocks as the main source of fluctuations in economies open to capital 
flows. Unlike us, most of these papers and other related papers with different methodologies 
have focused on the long-run composition of countries’ portfolios.
5 
Two recent  contributions  that emphasize the high-frequency behavior of international 
portfolios are Hnatkovska (2010) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010). Both document that in the 
U.S. there is a positive correlation between domestic purchases of foreign equity and foreign 
purchases of domestic equity and present DSGE models that can account for this correlation.
6 
Hnatkovska  (2010)  shows  that  this  correlation  can  be  explained  by  a  preponderance  of 
productivity shocks in the nontradable sector. Tille and van Wincoop (2010) show that, even in a 
model  with  a  single  good  and  endogenous  time  variation  in  expected  returns  and  risk, 
productivity shocks can account for the positive correlation of gross capital flows. These models 
are highly successful at matching some features of the data, but not all. For instance, Tille and 
Van Wincoop (2010)’s model predicts that gross capital flows are counter-cyclical, which is at 
                                                           
5 See, for example, Kraay and Ventura (2000), Evans and Hnatkovska (2005), Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and Martin 
(2010),  Devereux  and  Sutherland  (2010  and  2011),  and  Pavlova  and  Rigobon  (2010a).  Pavlova  and  Rigobon 
(2010b) provide a short survey of this literature. 
6 Dvorak (2003) presents similar evidence. 6 
 
odds with the evidence presented in this paper. Hnatkovska (2010)’s model does predict that 
gross capital flows are pro-cyclical. However, it also predicts a strongly negative correlation 
between portfolio equity and bond inflows, which is not observed in the data.
7 
At an intuitive level, while it is possible to construct models in which productivity shocks 
lead to a positive correlation between gross capital flows (between CIF and COD), this does not 
seem  the most natural effect  of  productivity shocks.  In particular, if a  negative productivity 
shock lowers the incentives for domestic agents to invest at home it would seem most natural 
that foreigners also have fewer incentives to invest in the country. That is why, we believe, 
models that account for the positive correlation between gross capital flows solely as a result of 
productivity shocks will likely have a hard time matching the different important features of the 
data. 
The  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  suggests  that  other  factors  besides  productivity 
shocks  must  be  important  determinants  of  gross  capital  flows.  In  addition,  and  unlike 
productivity shocks, these factors must affect foreign and domestic agents asymmetrically. One 
set  of  models  introduces  asymmetric  information  between  domestic  and  foreign  agents.  For 
example, Brenan and Cao (1997) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2008) argue that retrenchment 
during crises can take place if foreign agents are less informed than domestic agents about the 
return of domestic assets and crises increase this informational asymmetry.
8 
Other models introduce asymmetry in asset returns depending on whether the asset is 
held by foreign or domestic agents.  For example, in models based on sovereign risk , such as 
Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010), domestic agents are less likely to be defaulted on than 
                                                           
7 Business cycle models solely driven by shocks to the nontradable sector also tend to predict counter-cyclical real 
exchange, as the relative abundance of nontradable goods during booms reduces their price. This prediction also 
seems counterfactual. 
8 See also Dvorak (2003), who emphasizes informational asymmetry both between and within countries. 7 
 
foreign agents. This is because the welfare of domestic residents has a higher weight in the 
objective  function  of  the  government  than  the  welfare  of  foreigners.  Such  models  predict 
retrenchment  during  crises,  when  the  probability  of  default  increases  disproportionately  on 
foreign holders of domestic assets. More generally, all models in which crises are associated with 
a relative deterioration of foreigners’ property rights are likely to predict retrenchment during 
crises.
9 
Another potential asymmetry  comes from  the  access to liquidity during crises , with 
domestic agents probably becoming financially constrained relative to foreigners. The literature 
has shown that this asymmetry is likely to lead to fire sales of domestic firms to foreigners, and 
that this has happened in a number of cases.
10 Our results in this respect are mixed. We do find 
some evidence that FDI inflows by foreigners increase in high-income countries during severe 
crises, but this does not seem to be the case for  developing countries.
11 Of course, this does not 
mean that fire sales have not taken place for some types of assets during particular episodes. But 
overall fire sales do not appear to be an important determinant of capital flows in the average 
developing-country crisis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
characterizes the comovement  of capital flows by foreign and domestic agents. Section 4 
analyzes the behavior of gross capital flows over the business cycle and during crises. Section 5 
concludes.   
                                                           
9 Shocks to risk aversion can also lead to retrenchment during crises if agents consider foreign assets as riskier than 
domestic ones. One reason for this is that the return of assets denominated in domestic currency and the domestic 
price level tend to be positively correlated when the nominal exchange rate is volatile. Milesi-Ferreti and Tille 
(2010) argue that this effect might have been the driver of the retrenchment in flows observed during the 2008 
global financial crisis. 
10 See Krugman (1998), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009), and Acharya, Shin, and 
Yorulmazer (2010). 
11 We do find that FDI inflows by foreigners are more stable than other inflows. This relative stability of FDI flows 
has long been known for net capital flows. For a recent analysis, see Levchenko and Mauro (2007). 8 
 
2.  Data 
To document worldwide patterns of capital flows by domestic and foreign agents, we assemble a 
comprehensive dataset on aggregate gross capital flows, including not only capital inflows and 
outflows but also their subcomponents, reflecting the different flow types. The data come from 
the analytic presentation of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks (BOP).
12 The 
IMF’s BOP dataset provides country-level data, on an annual basis from 1970 until 2009, on 
different types of capital inflows measured in U.S. dollars. Fundamental to our goal, this dataset 
allows us to disentangle, respectively, capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) and capital 
inflows by foreigners (CIF), which are reported as flows related to the reporting country’s assets 
and liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents. In other words, CIF is recorded as capital inflows to the 
reporting economy by foreign agents, indicating an increase in foreigners’ holdings of domestic 
assets.  Analogously,  COD  is  reported  as  flows  from  the  reporting  economy,  where  positive 
values correspond to an increasing of the holdings of foreign assets by domestic agents.
13 Hence 
a positive COD should be interpreted as capital outflows by domestic agents whereas a negative 
COD means capital inflows. 
Our dataset also allows us to analyze the behavior of the different types of capital flows. 
Flows  are  classified  as:  direct  investments  (also  known  as  FDI),  portfolio  flows,  other 
investments (mostly bank flows and trade credit), and international reserves.
14 Portfolio flows are 
further divided into equity and debt flows. Bot h private and public flows are included in our 
                                                           
12 Debt refinancing and rescheduling entries that involve changes in existing debt contracts or replacement by new 
ones, generally with extended debt service payments are excluded from our dataset. In the analytic presentation of 
the IMF’s BOP, these flows (credit and debt entries that account for the new contracts) are computed within a 
country's financial account as exceptional financing items. Therefore, our analysis excludes items derived from the 
rescheduling or refinancing of existing debt contracts as they generally do not involve new capital inflows to the 
reporting country.  
13 These measures however do not capture increases in foreigners’ (domestic agents’) holdings of domestic (foreign) 
assets that are due to valuation effects. 
14 Due to their relatively small size and the scarcity of data, we exclude flows in financial derivatives from our 
analysis. 9 
 
dataset. Therefore, CIF, the measure of aggregate capital inflows by foreigners, is equivalent to 
the  sum  of  the  following  inflows:  direct  investments  in  the  reporting  economy,  portfolio 
investment  liabilities,  and  other  investment  liabilities.  Similarly,  COD  is  the  aggregation  of 
outflows of direct investments abroad, portfolio investment assets, other investment assets, and 
international reserve assets. As our aim is to shed light on both how large and how volatile 
capital flows are, we scale CIF and COD and their components by trend GDP throughout the 
paper.
 15 
Our  sample  of  countries  is  based  mostly  on  data  availability.  However,  we  exclude 
countries that are either very small or very poor. Small countries are a concern because they 
might display an artificially high volume of financial transactions due to their role as offshore 
financial centers or tax havens. A country is considered small if its gross national income (GNI) 
in 2005 was less than four billion U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted. Thirty countries are excluded from 
the analysis for this reason, among them Belize, Guyana, and Maldives. Poor countries generally 
depend heavily on official aid flows that behave differently than private capital flows, and are 
thus beyond the scope of our analysis. We exclude 46 countries with GNI per capita smaller than 
2,000 U.S. dollars (PPP adjusted) in 2005, among them Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Niger.
16 
We classify our final sample of 103 countries into groups according to t heir income 
levels as measured by their GNI per capita in 2005. In particular, we classify  low-income 
countries  as  those  with  GNI  per  capita  below  7,500  U.S.  dollars.  Middle-income  countries 
include those with GNI per capita between 7,500 and 15,000 U.S. dollars. These two groups, 
                                                           
15 Trend GDP is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the series of nominal GDP in U.S. dollars. 
Nominal GDP is obtained from the World Development Indicators. If data for the last years of the sample was not 
available, we complemented our dataset with data from the World Economic Outlook 2009. 
16 We used 2005 data on both GNI and GNI per capita as using more updated data  would reduce significantly our 
sample coverage. Moreover, the ranking of countries relative to the thresholds used in this paper does not change 
considerably over time. 10 
 
low- and middle-income countries, are more generally called developing countries in this paper. 
Lastly, high-income countries are those with GNI per capita above 15,000 U.S. dollars.
17 
In order to analyze capital flows around crises, we create a composite crisis indicator that 
takes into account banking, currency, and domestic and external debt crises on an annual basis. 
We consider the initial year of any of these measures of crises as the beginning of a crisis event. 
More precisely, a crisis  period starts the year when a country experiences the beginning of a 
crisis (according to any of the indicators) and no other crisis has been observed in the preceding 
two years. 
In order to obtain the starting dates of these diffe rent crises, we use several indicators 
available in the literature, all updated until 2009. Banking crises come from the dating of crisis 
periods available in Honohan and Laeven (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2008   and website 
update), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Currency crises are identified through the methodology 
in Laeven and Valencia (2008), which in turn follows Frankel and Rose (1996).
18 Under this 
definition, a country experiences a currency crisis if there is a nominal depreciation of the 
exchange rate of at least 30 percent that also represents at least a 10 percent increase in the rate 
of depreciation over the previous year. For countries meeting this criteria for several consecutive 
years, only the first year within five -year windows is considered a crisis year in our analysis. 
Domestic debt crises are identified by the year in which Standard & Poor’s downgrades the local 
currency debt of an economy into default. We also consider episodes identified in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009). Analogously, for external debt crises, we consider the crisis dating in Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) as well as Standard & Poor’s downgrades of 
foreign currency debt and foreign currency bank loans of an economy to default levels (up to 
                                                           
17 See Appendix Table 1 for the sample coverage. First and last years of available data are reported for each country. 
18 We use just one indicator of currency crises as most indicators described in the literature are constructed using 
data on reserves, one of our variables of interest, hence making them less appropriate for our analysis. 11 
 
2009). Appendix Table 2 lists all the crisis episodes considered in our sample. 
We further classify these crises events into two different types of episodes depending on 
the intensity of the turmoil affecting a country. First, we define one crisis episodes in which a 
country experiences the beginning of one, and only one, type of crisis in a given year, and no 
other type of crisis is observed in the preceding two years. The second episode type considers 
periods in which a country faces the beginning of more than one type of crisis within a given 
year, and no such event has occurred in the previous two years. These severe episodes are called 
more than one crisis. In sum, we distinguish between mild and severe crisis episodes according 
to the number of different types of crises a country faces in any given year.  
The final database, after the sample adjustments mentioned above, covers 103 countries 
over the 1970-2009 sample period. There are 39 countries classified as high-income, and 28 of 
these countries have experienced at least one crisis during our sample period and five countries 
have faced severe crisis episodes. Our sample includes 26 middle-income countries, which have 
experienced significantly more turmoil than high-income countries. All middle-income countries 
faced at least one crisis within our sample period and a total of 78 crises episodes (24 severe 
ones) have been observed in these countries. Lastly, 38 low-income countries are included in our 
empirical analysis and all but one country have gone through at least one crisis episode. In total, 
these low-income countries have experienced 96 crises episodes, with 27 being severe ones. 
 
3.  The Behavior of Capital Flows by Foreign and Domestic Agents 
In this section, we study the behavior of gross capital flows over the past decades. As a first pass 
at the data, Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution over time of CIF and COD (normalized by trend 
GDP) for a number of developed and developing countries, respectively. The figures show a 12 
 
strong positive comovement between CIF and COD, which indicates that capital inflows by 
foreigners and outflows by domestic agents move in tandem. Namely, when foreign investors 
pour  capital  into  domestic  markets,  domestic  agents  increase  their  investments  abroad.  This 
correlation seems to hold during both tranquil and turbulent periods, when a retrenchment in 
flows is observed. The figures also suggest that gross capital flows behave very differently from 
net capital flows (the difference in gross capital flows). For instance, the 2008 financial crisis 
was characterized by a sharp drop in gross capital flows around the world, even though net flows 
have remained relatively stable. As a consequence, gross capital flows seem more volatile than 
net capital flows. In the rest of this section, we document more formally the joint behavior of 
CIF and COD. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of gross capital flows (total and the components, i.e. 
CIF+COD, CIF, and COD) and net capital flows (CIF-COD). It shows that gross capital flows, 
measured as a percentage of output, have increased over time around the world. Confirming the 
trends in Figures 1 and 2, these increases suggests a broad process of financial globalization with 
capital flows by both domestic and foreign agents rising, especially so for high- and middle-
income countries. For example, CIF increases from about 4.8 percent (0.8 percent) of trend GDP 
for the median high-income (middle-income) country in the 1980s to more than 15 percent (5 
percent) of trend GDP in high-income (middle-income) economies in the 2000s. Similar patterns 
are observed for COD. Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence of such a positive trend in net 
capital flows, despite the high attention by the literature. If anything, they have decreased over 
time for both high- and low-income countries. Therefore, to gauge the extent of globalization 
with capital flows measures it seems important to focus on gross capital flows as opposed to net 
capital flows. 13 
 
Table 1 also shows that over time the volatility of gross capital inflows has increased 
significantly, more than that of net capital flows. For high-income countries, the median standard 
deviation of CIF (COD) is 9.2 (8.1) percent of trend GDP during the 2000s, compared to 2.7 
(2.3) during the 1970s. In middle- and low-income countries the increase in the volatility of 
gross flows is less pronounced. For example, the median standard deviation of CIF is 5 percent 
of trend GDP for middle-income countries in the 2000s, compared to 3.1 during the 1970s. In 
low-income countries, an even less pronounced trend is observed. The standard deviation of 
COD (CIF) goes from 2.1 (3.4) in the 1980s to 3.4 (3.9) in the 2000s. 
These statistics indicate that the volatility of gross capital flows is larger for high-income 
countries than for middle-income countries in recent decades. These patterns stand in contrast 
with the well-known fact that net capital flows are more volatile in developing countries, which 
is also observed in our analysis. The median standard deviation of net capital flows is 3.9 and 5.6 
for high- and middle-income countries, respectively, over the entire sample period. In contrast to 
the observed patterns in gross capital flows, the volatility of net capital flows has remained 
relatively stable over the past three decades for countries across all income levels. Thus, the 
standard  deviation  of  net  capital  inflows  in  middle-income  countries  reaches  3.9  during  the 
1970s, increases to 4.2 in the 1990s, and declines back to 3.9 in the 2000s. In high- and low-
income  countries,  the  volatility  of  flows  has  increased  slightly  over  time.  In  low-income 
countries, the standard deviation of net flows is 4.1 percent of trend GDP in the 1980s and 
reaches 4.4 in the 2000s.  
The statistics in Table 1 suggest that gross capital flows are not only increasingly larger, 
but also increasingly  are more volatile, with the difference with respect to  net capital flows 
growing over time. This pattern is observed for high-income countries over the whole sample 14 
 
and for middle-income countries during the 2000s. For example, as shown in Table 1, the median 
standard deviation of COD and CIF for high-income countries is 8.1 and 7.8 percent of trend 
GDP, respectively, a much larger statistics than the standard deviation of net flows, 3.9 percent 
of trend GDP. If one considers only the 2000s, the differences are even larger. In middle-income 
countries, the standard deviation of net flows is also smaller than that of gross capital flows by 
both foreign and domestic agents during the 2000s. In contrast, the volatility of net capital flows 
is actually higher than that of its disaggregated components during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
Likely reflecting the more closed capital accounts and greater restrictions on foreign investments 
by domestic agents in those countries, especially in the first half of our sample, the volatility of 
net flows is larger than that of gross capital flows throughout our entire sample for low-income 
countries. 
The patterns documented above suggest an increasing importance of gross capital flows, 
particularly starting in the 2000s. Figure 3 further illustrates how gross flows have increased over 
time  while  net  capital  flows  have  remained  relatively  stable.  The  figure  shows  ellipses 
corresponding to the bivariate Gaussian distribution of COD and CIF. Each ellipsis summarizes 
the distribution of the observations (one per country-year) separately for the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. The ellipses are centered at the mean of these variables and their shape is given by their 
covariance matrix. The main axes of the ellipses are given by the first and second principal 
components of the covariance matrix, while the boundaries of the ellipses capture two standard 
deviations, hence encompassing 86% of the total probability mass. An increase in size in these 
ellipses along the inverted 45-degree line shows an increase in gross capital flows, whereas the 
distance between the boundaries of the ellipses and this inverted 45-degree line indicates the 
magnitude of net capital flows. Notice that the inverted 45-degree line in Figure 3 captures 15 
 
country-year observations in which net capital flows are zero, i.e. COD is equal to CIF. Thus, 
Figure 3 shows that capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents have increased steadily 
over time, and especially so in the 2000s, while net flows have not changed considerably over 
time. 
Our results so far support a generalized process of financial globalization with capital 
flows by both foreign and domestic agents increasing significantly over time, particularly since 
the 1990s. We next assess whether this suggested positive correlation between CIF and COD 
indeed holds when performing a cross-country and time-series comparison over the four decades 
under study. More formally, we estimate the following regressions: 
, , , , t c t c t c Controls COD CIF           (1) 
, , , , t c t c t c Controls CIF COD           (2) 
where Controls stand for additional control-variables such as country trends. To prevent the 
estimates from being driven by individual countries, CIF and COD are not only scaled by trend 
GDP, but also further standardized by de-meaning and scaling by their corresponding standard 
deviations on a country-by-country basis. The results are reported in Table 2, where countries are 
once more split in our three income groups. We present estimations for the whole sample as well 
as for each of the decades under analysis. 
The estimations provide robust evidence that CIF is positively correlated with COD. In 
other words, when foreigners invest in  a country, its domestic agents invest abroad. Such a 
positive  correlation  generates  an  expansion  in  financial  globalization,  in  which  a  country’s 
international assets  and liabilities expand. Conversely, when foreign capital leaves, domestic 
capital placed abroad is repatriated. In other words, a retrenchment in gross capital flows is 
observed. In line with the graphical evidence, the positive comovement between gross capital 16 
 
flows has increased over time, as the magnitude of the coefficients increases. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient increases with countries’ income level. The estimated coefficient for low-
income countries is 0.27, while the same parameter is 0.44 for middle-income countries and 0.78 
for high-income countries.
19 
In sum, the evidence in this section suggests that capital flows by domestic and foreign 
agents have become increasingly large and volatile, surpassing the size and, in most cases, the 
volatility of net capital flows. Furthermore,  CIF and COD are positively correlated. In other 
words, there are periods of globalization and periods of retrenchment. We investigate next the 
cyclical properties of gross capital flows and their behavior around financial crises. 
 
4.  The Cyclical Behavior of Gross Capital Flows 
In the previous section, we showed that capital inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic 
agents are positively correlated. In this section, we explore the cyclical properties of gross capital 
flows by analyzing the behavior of CIF and COD over the business cycle and around crises. We 
provide empirical evidence that periods of financial globalization tend to occur during economic 
expansions and retrenchment periods tend to occur during contractions or crises. 
 
4.1  Gross Capital Flows over the Business Cycle 
To analyze the cyclical properties of gross capital flows, we estimate the following equations: 
, , , , t c t c t c Controls X Y           (3) 
where  t c Y ,   stands for  CIF,  COD,  or  a  measure  of  aggregate  gross  flows  (CIF+COD);  Xc,t 
represents either net capital flows, the trade balance in goods and services, or a measure of GDP 
                                                           
19 Similar estimates are obtained if a different set of controls is used. If year dummies are included the results are 
qualitatively similar, although point estimates decrease, suggesting the presence of systemic or aggregate effects. 17 
 
fluctuations; and Controls stand for additional control variables such as country trends, as above. 
In these regressions, net capital flows are calculated using the standardized versions of CIF and 
COD. The trade balance in goods and services is also scaled by trend GDP, demeaned and 
standardized by its standard deviations at the country level.
20 Our measure of business cycles is 
based on real GDP in constant un its of local currency.
21 More specifically, we use the growth 
rates in real GDP, which should capture accurately the current state of the economy over the 
business cycle.
22 
The results are reported in Table 3.  They show that n et capital inflows are strongly 
associated with capital inflows by foreigners for all income groups. For high -income countries, 
they are also strongly correlated with capital outflows by domestic agents. However, such 
association is not as strong in middle - and low-income countries, where larger coefficients are 
estimated for CIF. Note that net capital flows are calculated as the difference between CIF and 
COD, and are thus, by construction, correlated with our dependent variables. To partly avoid this 
correlation, we use the trade balance in goods and services as an alternative measure of capital 
flows to the extent that it captures the other side of the balance of payments. The estimated 
coefficients confirm the previous results. The trade balance is strongly correlated with capital 
flows by foreigners, and more so than flows by domestic agents in middle- and low-income 
countries. 
Regarding the dynamics of gross capital flows during the business cycles, we find that 
gross capital flows expand during good times, while during bad times, they decline. In other 
                                                           
20 The data on the trade balance are from the IMF's Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbooks. 
21 Real GDP in constant units of local currency comes from the World Bank ’s World Development Indicators. This 
information  was complemented  with data  from  the IMF’s  World Economic Outlook 2009 if the data  from the 
original source were missing. 
22 As an alternative measure of business cycles, we also considered a measure of output gap based on the Hodrick -
Prescott filter. The results were qualitatively similar to the ones reported here. 18 
 
words, we find that not only capital flows by foreigners are pro-cyclical. Capital outflows by 
domestic agents are also pro-cyclical, with domestic agents investing more abroad in good times 
when the domestic economy is above potential or is growing in real terms. As a consequence, as 
shown  by  the  estimated  coefficients  on  CIF+COD,  expansions  in  financial  globalization,  in 
which a country’s international assets and liabilities expand, are observed during good times. 
Analogously,  during  downturns  in  economic  activity,  there  is  retrenchment  in  gross  capital 
flows. 
The evidence in Table 3 expands the widely-documented pro-cyclicality of net capital 
inflows.  During  booms,  foreigners  increase  their  purchases  of  domestic  assets  and  domestic 
agents  augment  their  investments  abroad.  These  patterns  suggest  that  changes  in  net  capital 
inflows  are  driven  mostly  by  foreigners  in  developing  economies;  with  domestic  agents’ 
behavior being most relevant for the behavior of net flows in high-income countries. 
 
4.2  Gross Capital Flows during Crises 
To analyze how gross capital flows behave during crises, we start by providing some descriptive 
statistics  comparing  the  behavior  of  CIF  and  COD  during  turbulent  and  tranquil  periods. 
Turbulent periods are defined as  those falling  within a five-year window around each crisis 
episode.  
Table 4 shows that both capital inflows by foreigners and capital outflows by domestic 
agents decline during turbulent periods for countries from all income groups. For example, CIF 
falls by almost 50 percent for high-income countries while COD decreases by about 65 percent. 
Similarly, declines between 40 and 50 percent of trend GDP in gross capital flows are observed 
in low-income countries. In middle-income countries, the retrenchment in gross capital flows is 19 
 
even stronger – CIF declines from inflows of 7.2 percent of trend GDP to actual outflows of 2.6 
percent of trend GDP and COD goes from outflows of 6.5 percent of trend GDP to inflows of 2.6 
percent of trend GDP.
23  
Despite the similarities in the dynamics of gross capital flows among countries from all 
income levels, the behavior of net capital flows is rather contrasting. While net capital inflows 
increase during crises for high -income countries, middle-  and low-income countries face a 
decline in net capital inflows. This evidence is consistent with retrenchment by domestic agents 
being  stronger than that of foreigners in high -income countries but  weaker in developing 
economies. 
An event study analysis   of gross capital flows around crises reinforces th e  evidence 
above. For this exercise, we focus on the dynamics of  CIF and COD not only during the crisis 
years, but also in the run-up to crises and the immediate aftermath by analyzing the two years 
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(4) 
where  t c Y ,  stands for our standardized measures of  CIF or COD; Crisis is the composite crisis 
indicator; and Controls capture the additional control variables such as country trends.
24 Once 
more, we perform the analysis by pooling countries according to their income level.  
The estimates are presented in Table 5 and Figure 4. They provide robust evidence of 
retrenchment, that is,  capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents  decline for countries 
from all income groups. In particular, both CIF and COD are negative and statistically different 
                                                           
23 To the extent that official flows are unlikely to decline during crises, the milder reaction of capital flows in low-
income countries when compared to middle-income ones might be explained by the relative size of these flows. 
24 We report results with country trends as controls only, but our results are qualitatively similar if we add year 
dummies as controls as well. 20 
 
than zero during the crisis years for countries in all income groups, except for CIF in high-
income countries. Table 5 also presents Wald statistics that test if the behavior of flows during 
the crisis years or in the immediate aftermath was significantly different from the one observed 
in the run-up. The Wald tests show that the decline in capital inflows by foreigners and capital 
outflows by domestic agents during the crisis years (in comparison to the average flow in the 
previous two years) is statistically significant for all income levels, including CIF in high-income 
countries. Furthermore, the Wald tests show that gross capital flows remain at depressed levels, 
or decline even further, during the two-year period after the onset of the crisis. 
Figure 4 shows that the median retrenchment in gross capital flows around crises is rather 
large.  For  instance,  CIF  in  high-income  countries  on  average  declines  from  inflows  of  5.5 
percent of trend GDP during the pre-crisis year to outflows of 4.3 percent during the first post-
crisis year. In middle-income countries, these flows reverse from 0.4 to -2.5 percent of trend 
GDP over the same period. In low-income countries, CIF declines from around 0.2 percent of 
trend GDP during the two years preceding the turmoil period to around -1.7 percent of trend 
GDP during the year following the onset of the crisis. Similar numbers are estimated for COD. 
The analysis so far has included the global financial crisis that hit countries in 2008. 
However, the empirical evidence in Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010) suggests that this latest crisis 
has been marked by a significant decline in capital flows around the world. A re-estimation of 
equation (4) around this episode, reported in the top panel of Table 6, reproduces their findings. 
The  Wald  tests  suggest  a  significant  retrenchment  in  capital  flows  during  in  2008  and  the 
following year in comparison to the pre-crisis period for all income groups.  
To  test  if  the  2008  global  financial  crisis  is  driving  our  results  and  as  a  robustness 
exercise, we re-estimate our event study analysis excluding this episode. The results are reported 21 
 
in the bottom panel of Table 6 and show that our previous results stand and remain statistically 
and economically significant. Both CIF and COD decline significantly during the crisis year and, 
according to the Wald tests, are statistically smaller than their average during the preceding two 
years. Also consistent with our previous results, gross capital flows during the post-crisis period 
remain at depressed levels in comparison to the run up to crises. In sum, the results in Table 6 
show that the behavior of foreign and domestic agents during the recent financial crisis is in line 
with  their  behavior  during  previous  crisis  episodes,  with  estimates  confirming  a  generalized 
retrenchment of gross capital flows around these events. Hence, for the remainder of the paper, 
we proceed with the analysis of the data based on our entire sample period, from 1970 to 2009.  
Thus far we have considered a single crisis indicator that pools together several types of 
financial crises for a particular country in a given year. We extend this analysis by considering 
the intensity of the turmoil episodes and distinguishing mild and severe crisis episodes.
25 In 
particular, as described in Section 2, we classify crisis events into: one crisis episodes, in which a 
country experiences the beginning of one, and only one, type of crisis in a given year; and more 
than one crisis episodes, in which a country faces the beginning of more than one type of crisis 
within a given year. We estimate the following equation, which adapts equation (4) to these two 
indicators: 
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(5) 
where  t c Y ,  stands for our standardized measures of CIF or COD; One Crisis corresponds to the 
one crisis indicator; More One Crisis stands for the more than one crisis indicator; and Controls 
capture additional control variables such as country trends.  
                                                           
25 De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2009) show that twin crises feature larger output losses than milder episodes.  22 
 
The estimates for equation (5) are reported in Table 7 and Figure 5. The results suggest a 
significant retrenchment in gross capital flows; both domestic and foreign agents decline their 
cross-country  outflows  around  both  mild  and  severe  crisis  episodes  for  all  income  groups. 
During one crisis episodes, CIF and COD decline at the onset of the crisis as well as in its 
aftermath, and even more so for high-income countries, if compared to the two years before the 
crisis. Similar statistically significant results are found around more than once crisis episodes. 
Wald tests reported in Table 7 show that CIF and COD are significantly smaller during the crisis 
year relative to the pre-crisis average for countries from all income groups in our sample. The 
results however suggest that the fall in capital flows by domestic agents in the aftermath of 
severe crises is more short-lived and reversed during the following two years. Wald tests reject 
that COD is statistically different in the aftermath of the turmoil episode if compared to its pre-
crisis values. 
The retrenchment in gross capital flows is not only statistically but also economically 
significant as shown in Figure 5. In high-income countries, CIF reversers from 5.2 percent of 
trend GDP in the year preceding one crisis episodes in the average country to less than -4.4 
percent of trend GDP in the first year after the onset of the crisis, suggesting a collapse in flows 
of  over  9  percentage  points.  Domestic  agents  behave  similarly  during  these  episodes.  This 
retrenchment in gross capital flows around mild crisis episodes is also large in middle-income 
countries, where a decline of almost 4 percentage points takes place on average during the five-
year window around mild  crisis  episodes,  and slightly milder in  low-income countries,  with 
declines of about 1 percentage point of trend GDP over the same period. During more than one 
crisis episodes, similar patterns are observed. Capital inflows by domestic agents decline from 
15.7 percent of trend GDP in high-income countries to about 4 percent in the aftermath of the 23 
 
crisis  year, implying a  collapse of flows  of about  11.5 percentage points.  In middle-income 
countries,  COD  declines  around  5  percentage  points  of  trend  GDP  during  the  crisis  year  if 
compared with the previous two years. Once more, a milder decline of 2 percentage points over 
the same period is observed in low-income countries. 
Figure 5 also suggests that the reaction of domestic and foreign agents might be stronger 
during severe crisis episodes. More than one crisis episodes lead to significant retrenchment in 
capital flows by foreign and domestic agents during the crisis  year and  a significant fall by 
foreign agents during the following two years. Wald tests reported in Table 7 shows that this 
graphical evidence is statistically significant for middle- and low-income countries.
26 
Overall, the results reported in Table 7 and Figure 5 show that the retrenchment in gross 
capital flows takes place not only around severe crises but also around mild ones. Furthermore, 
these estimations suggest that such a retrenchment by domestic and foreign agents is indeed a 
stylized fact regarding the dynamics of gross capital flows during crises.  
 
4.3  The Dynamics of the Subcomponents of Gross Capital Flows 
In this section, we analyze whether the patterns of gross capital flows documented above are 
widespread across flow types or driven by a single type of flow. This is important because some 
types of flows might behave in particular ways. For example, reserves are likely to play an 
important role, especially in developing countries trying to stabilize their exchange rates. We 
show that the observed patterns of gross capital flows are indeed present in most subcomponents 
of gross capital flows. 
We start by discussing the relative size and evolution of the different subcomponents of 
                                                           
26 The test results for high-income countries are less robust probably because of the low number of severe episodes, 
only five in our sample. 24 
 
gross  capital  flows  over  the  past  decades.  A  decomposition  of  gross  flows  into  portfolio 
investment  flows,  other  investments,  and  direct  investment  flows  suggest  that  their  relative 
importance varies across income levels. Table 8 presents summary statistics. In high-income 
countries,  other  investment  flows  are  the  largest  subcomponent  of  both  CIF  and  COD, 
representing almost 50 percent and 40 percent, respectively. In contrast, in developing countries 
around half of CIF takes the form of direct investments. For example, the median middle-income 
(low-income) country received FDI of 2.2 (2.5) percent of trend GDP in comparison to portfolio 
investments of 0.6 (0.1) percent and other investments of 1.6 (1.9) percent. On the other hand, 
international  reserves  represent  46  (58)  percent  of  COD  in  middle-income  (low-income) 
countries. 
Although the striking increase in gross capital flows over time is evident in Table 8, it has 
not taken place across all types of flows. Other investment flows capture the bulk of the increase 
in CIF in high-income countries, whereas FDI flows have increased the most for developing 
countries  since  the  1990s.  If  anything,  in  low-income  countries,  other  investment  flows  by 
foreign agents have actually decreased since the 1980s. Regarding COD, other investment flows 
have  increased  considerably  during  the  2000s  for  all  income  groups.  Still,  for  developing 
countries, the expansion of international reserves explains a large part of the increase in COD. 
In sum, these summary statistics suggest that the dynamics of gross capital flows around 
crises might be driven by different types of flows in different income groups.
 27 
In order to assess the relevance of the various flow types on the dynamics of aggregate 
                                                           
27 Also the evidence on the volatility of the different types of flows sheds light on their dynamics. Other investment 
flows  by  foreigners  are  the  most  volatile  flow  type  for  all  income  levels.  This  stands  in  contrast  to  existing 
perceptions that portfolio flows are the most volatile type of flow. In fact, the volatility of these flows is similar 
across high- and middle income countries. Similar patterns are observed for other investment flows by domestic 
agents. Their standard deviation is larger than that of portfolio outflows or direct investments abroad for all income 
groups. International reserves nevertheless are slightly more volatile in developing countries. 25 
 
gross capital flows during periods of financial distress, we re-estimate equation (5) separately for 
each component of COD and CIF. The results for high-, middle-, and low-income countries are 
reported in Tables 9A through 9C, respectively. The estimations strongly suggest asymmetric 
effects across both components of capital flows and income levels. 
The results on the different components of  CIF reflect partly the relative size of the 
different  flows.  The  statistically  significant  decline  in  other  investment  flows  by  foreigners 
during both mild and severe episodes is a regular pattern for countries from all income groups. 
Nevertheless, contrasting patterns arise for other flow types. For instance, while portfolio debt 
inflows decline during the post-crisis periods of both mild and severe crises in high- and low-
income countries; in middle-income countries, these inflows remain relatively stable within our 
five-year windows around one crisis episodes, but significantly decrease around severe episodes. 
Furthermore, portfolio equity inflows do not fall considerably in middle-income countries around 
severe crisis episodes, whereas they actually decline in high- and low-income countries. During 
mild episodes, these flows contract in high- and middle-income countries but not in low-income 
ones.  Lastly,  foreign  direct  investments  decline  only  in  response  to  mild  crisis  episodes, 
remaining  relatively stable, or even increasing, during severe crisis  episodes in  high-income 
countries.  In  contrast,  FDI  inflows  are  relatively  stable  during  mild  crises  in  low-income 
countries and tend to decline during severe crises. Middle-income countries are somewhere in 
between, with significant declines during both mild and severe crisis episodes. Overall, portfolio 
debt inflows and other investment inflows drive most of the decrease in CIF during more than 
one crisis episodes, especially in high- and middle-income countries. The patterns for one crisis 
events are more diffuse, varying among income levels, though other investment flows still play a 
significant role. 26 
 
Regarding the subcomponents of COD, the differences across countries are even more 
striking. In high-income countries, all flow types but those related to international reserves fall 
around one crisis episodes, international reserve flows contract significantly in middle-income 
countries. During more than one crisis episodes, international reserves decline in both low- and 
middle-income countries. The selloff of foreign assets by domestic agents in middle- and low-
income  countries  is,  however,  not  concentrated  in  international  reserves.  For  middle-income 
countries, there is also a significant decline in direct investments abroad and portfolio outflows 
during severe crises episodes and a decline in portfolio equity and other investment outflows 
during mild crisis episodes. In contrast, low-income countries face only a contraction in other 
investment  outflows  in  severe  crises  years.  During  mild  crises,  there  is  a  weak  decrease  in 
portfolio equity and other investment outflows. In sum, while high-income countries do not sell 
their  international  reserve  assets  during  turbulent  periods,  less  developed  countries,  and 
especially middle-income ones, make a buffer use of international reserves. Other investment 
outflows and direct investment abroad are the other flow types mostly driving the aggregate 
dynamics of COD. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper provides  a number of important  stylized facts  on the dynamic behavior of gross 
capital flows by domestic and foreign agents. We have shown that: (i) while the volatility of 
gross  capital  flows  has  increased  over  time,  this  increase  has  not  translated  in  the  same 
magnitude  into  more  volatile  net  capital  flows,  since  CIF  and  COD  are  highly  positively 
correlated;  (ii)  gross  capital  flows  are  pro-cyclical,  with  CIF  and  COD  increasing  during 
expansions; (iii) total gross capital flows retrench significantly during crises, especially severe 27 
 
ones, and during economic downturns; and (iv) the behavior of gross capital flows during crises 
is not driven by a single component, although international reserves play an important role in 
middle-  and  low-income  countries  and  debt  flows  play  an  important  role  in  advanced  and 
middle-income countries. 
The identified behavior of gross capital flows allows us to shed light on the sources of 
fluctuations in economies open to capital flows. The evidence runs contrary to the view that 
capital flows are mostly driven by productivity shocks, since such shocks would generally imply 
a similar behavior towards domestic assets by foreigners and domestic agents. More generally, 
our empirical evidence points to crises affecting foreign and domestic agents asymmetrically. 
Examples  of  models  where  such  asymmetry  plays  an  important  role  include  models  with 
asymmetric information and models of sovereign risk. Interestingly, we also find little evidence 
that, on average, gross capital flows are driven by fire sales of domestic assets to foreigners 
and/or domestic capital flight. 
Regardless of our own specific interpretation of the evidence, it is clear that it is not 
possible to reject or prove right general classes of models. Still, given the importance of gross 
capital flows, the stylized facts we provide in this paper will help judge the relevance of existing 
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Capital Flows in High-Income Countries
The figure shows the evolution of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF ) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) as a percentage of trend





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents Capital Outflows by Domestic AgentsFigure 2
Capital Flows in Low- and Middle-Income Countries
The figure shows the evolution of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF ) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) as a percentage of trend








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents Capital Outflows by Domestic AgentsFigure 3
Joint Distribution of Capital Flows
The figure shows ellipses that account for the joint distribution of capital flows by foreign and domestic agents.
One ellipsis for each decade is reported. Each ellipsis captures 103 points and each one point represents the
average for that decade for a country in our sample. Capital flows are scaled by trend GDP. 

































































Capital Flows around Crises
The figure shows the economic significance of the regression coefficients in the event study analyses of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and
capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) around five-year windows of crisis periods. These regressions are reported in Table 5. The economic
significance is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient and the median one standard deviation of the non-standardized version of the
dependent variable across countries with at least one crisis during the period of analysis. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then




































































































Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents Capital Outflows by Domestic AgentsFigure 5
Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
One Crisis
More than One Crisis
The figure shows the economic significance of the regression coefficients in the event study analyses of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD ) 
around five-year windows of crisis periods. These regressions are reported in Table 6. Crisis events are divided into one crisis periods and more than one crisis periods, according to their
intensity. The economic significance is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient and the median one standard deviation of the non-standardized version of the dependent variable
across countries with at least one crisis during the period of analysis. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard


























































































































































































































Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.64 3.92 1.29 5.62 2.08 5.51
   1970s 1.64 2.41 3.37 3.94 3.54 3.09
   1980s 1.42 2.71 0.39 5.56 2.71 4.11
   1990s 0.87 2.79 0.82 4.23 1.28 4.18
   2000s -0.18 3.60 1.90 3.94 0.56 4.37
Total Gross Capital Flows (CIF + COD) 17.67 15.49 9.31 10.01 6.97 7.17
   1970s 9.50 3.62 7.01 5.27 7.92 2.75
   1980s 9.10 6.16 1.96 5.95 4.86 3.90
   1990s 13.56 9.39 7.80 5.60 7.21 5.56
   2000s 32.65 16.70 15.06 8.48 8.41 6.21
Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents (CIF) 8.89 7.81 4.83 6.06 4.07 5.21
   1970s 4.73 2.66 5.08 3.07 5.62 2.29
   1980s 4.79 3.47 0.83 4.03 3.99 3.37
   1990s 7.00 5.54 3.96 4.12 4.43 4.16
   2000s 15.16 9.16 5.58 4.96 4.22 3.93
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents (COD) 8.33 8.05 3.78 5.10 2.87 3.87
   1970s 3.43 2.29 3.34 2.96 2.07 1.77
   1980s 3.78 3.09 1.40 2.71 0.54 2.06
   1990s 6.56 5.32 2.80 3.32 2.54 3.03
   2000s 17.71 8.13 6.44 4.86 3.73 3.35
No. of Countries
The table shows summary statistics of capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents as well as net capital flows
and total gross capital flows. The median value of country averages and of country standard deviations of capital
flows over trend GDP are shown. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Table 1








COD = β*CIF  (a) 0.48 ** 0.83 *** 0.93 *** 0.78 *** 0.28 0.23 *** 0.65 *** 0.44 *** 0.09 0.38 *** 0.31 *** 0.27 ***
[0.20] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.17] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06]
CIF  = β*COD (b) 0.37 *** 0.68 *** 0.92 *** 0.75 *** 0.25 0.36 *** 0.88 *** 0.45 *** 0.16 0.40 *** 0.45 *** 0.27 ***
[0.12] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.16] [0.11] [0.06] [0.07] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10] [0.06]
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Countries 34 39 39 39 20 26 25 26 29 38 37 38
No. of Observations 338 371 365 1,300 176 237 226 702 277 329 332 1,050
R-squared (a) 0.46 0.68 0.89 0.71 0.45 0.40 0.70 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.23
R-squared (b) 0.46 0.73 0.89 0.71 0.33 0.23 0.67 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.44 0.23
Table 2
Correlation between Capital Flows
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF ) on capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) and COD on CIF by decade, controlling for country-trend
effects. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1%, respectively. 
2000s Whole Sample 1980s 1990s 2000s Whole Sample 1980s 2000s Whole Sample 1980s 1990sNet Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.02
[0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
Trade Balance -0.25 *** 0.19 ** 0.00
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07]
GDP Growth 3.58 ** 5.20 *** 5.17 ***
[1.45] [1.46] [1.41]
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
No. of Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1287 1287 1287
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.35
Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.63 *** -0.26 ** 0.26 **
[0.06] [0.09] [0.10]
Trade Balance -0.59 *** 0.21 ** -0.25 ***
[0.04] [0.09] [0.08]
GDP Growth 3.90 *** 3.18 *** 4.47 ***
[0.91] [0.92] [0.87]
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
No. of Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 681 681 681
R-squared 0.53 0.25 0.28 0.46 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.27
Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.72 *** -0.39 *** 0.32 ***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.06]
Trade Balance -0.58 *** 0.30 *** -0.27 ***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
GDP Growth 3.02 *** 2.95 *** 3.71 ***
[0.86] [0.78] [0.87]
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Countries 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
No. of Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1042 1042 1042
R-squared 0.60 0.29 0.23 0.40 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18
COD CIF+COD
Table 3
Cyclicality in Capital Flows
High-Income Countries
CIF COD CIF+COD CIF COD CIF+COD CIF
Middle-Income Countries
CIF COD CIF+COD CIF COD CIF+COD CIF COD CIF+COD
Low-Income Countries
CIF COD CIF+COD CIF COD CIF+COD CIF
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF), capital outflows by domestic agents (COD), and a measure of aggregate
capital flows, CIF+COD, on net capital flows, the trade balance in goods and services, and real GDP growth. All regressions control for country-trend effects. Capital
flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is from











Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD)
Non-Crisis Years -0.18 0.76 1.73
Crisis Years 2.58 -0.02 1.29
Total Gross Capital Flows (CIF + COD)
Non-Crisis Years 27.53 13.66 8.45
Crisis Years 12.43 -5.21 4.62
Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents (CIF)
Non-Crisis Years 13.67 7.21 5.09
Crisis Years 7.50 -2.62 2.96
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents (COD)
Non-Crisis Years 13.86 6.45 3.36
Crisis Years 4.92 -2.60 1.66
No. of Countries 39 26 38
Table 4
Capital Flows: Tranquil vs. Crisis Periods
The table shows average capital flows around crisis and non-crisis periods. Crisis years
capture five-year windows around the crisis events, as described in Section 2 of the main
text. Non-crisis years capture all the remaing years in the sample. Capital flows are
measured as a percentage of trend GDP. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.  Year t - 2 0.50 *** 0.20 0.21 * 0.18 * 0.05 0.03
[0.11] [0.13] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11] [0.11]
Year t - 1 0.70 *** 0.42 *** 0.07 -0.18 0.04 -0.08
[0.13] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.08]
Crisis Year -0.13 -0.42 *** -0.44 *** -0.52 *** -0.29 *** -0.25 **
[0.12] [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.08] [0.09]
Year t - 2 -0.55 *** -0.63 *** -0.41 *** 0.01 -0.34 *** 0.09
[0.11] [0.15] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09]
Year t - 1 -0.27 * -0.28 ** -0.41 *** -0.13 -0.30 *** -0.13
[0.14] [0.12] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.09]
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.73 *** -0.73 *** -0.58 *** -0.52 *** -0.34 *** -0.23 *
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.92 *** -0.75 *** -0.56 *** -0.21 *** -0.36 *** -0.07 *
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Crises 85 85 134 134 158 158
No. of Countries 39 39 26 26 38 38
No. of Observations 1300 1300 702 702 1050 1050
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.18
COD
Table 5
Capital Flows around Crises
High-Income Countries Middle-Income  Low-Income Countries
CIF COD CIF COD CIF
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents
(COD) on a five-year window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Capital flows are first normalized by trend
GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests
comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the
country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.Year 2006 1.36 *** 1.55 *** 0.80 *** 1.16 *** 0.15 1.01 ***
[0.19] [0.16] [0.21] [0.21] [0.17] [0.17]
Year 2007 2.22 *** 2.25 *** 1.75 *** 1.91 *** 0.65 *** 1.18 ***
[0.19] [0.16] [0.25] [0.23] [0.22] [0.23]
Year 2008 0.36 0.19 0.48 ** 0.11 0.59 *** 0.18
[0.25] [0.27] [0.22] [0.24] [0.16] [0.24]
Year 2009 -0.21 -0.14 0.21 0.34 0.02 0.58
[0.30] [0.28] [0.24] [0.23] [0.39] [0.71]
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Year 2008 vs. Avg. Previous 2 Years -1.43 *** -1.71 *** -0.80 *** -1.43 *** 0.19 -0.92 ***
Avg. 2008 /2009 vs. Avg. Previous 2 Years -1.72 *** -1.88 *** -0.93 *** -1.31 *** -0.10 -0.72 **
No. of Countries 39 39 23 23 37 37
No. of Observations 132 132 81 81 110 110
R-squared 0.56 0.61 0.52 0.59 0.17 0.34
Year t - 2 0.35 *** -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02
[0.10] [0.14] [0.11] [0.09] [0.12] [0.11]
Year t - 1 0.28 ** -0.07 -0.03 -0.24 ** 0.05 -0.07
[0.13] [0.11] [0.13] [0.10] [0.10] [0.07]
Crisis Year -0.01 -0.27 ** -0.45 *** -0.49 *** -0.28 *** -0.25 **
[0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.07] [0.10]
Year t + 1 -0.32 *** -0.38 ** -0.37 *** 0.07 -0.30 *** 0.12
[0.11] [0.15] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09]
Year t + 2 -0.19 -0.18 -0.35 *** -0.08 -0.24 ** -0.08
[0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09]
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.33 *** -0.23 *** -0.50 *** -0.41 *** -0.34 *** -0.23 *
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.49 *** -0.23 *** -0.44 *** -0.09 -0.33 *** -0.05
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Crises 66 66 127 127 154 154
No. of Countries 39 39 26 26 38 38
No. of Observations 1168 1168 621 621 940 940




Panel A. Capital Flows around 2008




Low-Income            
Countries
CIF COD CIF COD CIF
The table reports two sets of regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD ) on 
different explanatory variables. Panel A reports pooled OLS regressions on four year dummies for the 2006-2009 period. Panel B
reports fixed-effects panel regressions on a five-year window around crisis events for the 1970-2005 period, controlling for country-
trend effects. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard
deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported in both Panels.
Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Panel B. Excluding the 2008 Crisis




Low-Income            
Countries
CIF COD CIF COD CIF CODOne Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.45 *** 0.14 0.21 * 0.26 *** -0.07 -0.01
   Year t - 1 0.67 *** 0.34 ** -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07
   Crisis Year -0.12 -0.45 *** -0.33 ** -0.37 *** -0.21 ** -0.19 **
   Year t + 1 -0.56 *** -0.71 *** -0.35 *** -0.03 -0.26 ** 0.06
   Year t + 2 -0.29 ** -0.31 ** -0.41 *** -0.24 *** -0.26 ** -0.15
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.68 *** -0.69 *** -0.43 *** -0.43 *** -0.16 ** -0.15
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.88 *** -0.73 *** -0.46 *** -0.27 *** -0.19 ** -0.05
More than One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 1.72 *** 1.03 ** 0.24 -0.10 0.43 * 0.15
   Year t - 1 1.62 *** 1.84 ** 0.34 -0.28 0.27 -0.06
   Crisis Year -0.35 -0.04 -0.92 *** -1.06 *** -0.63 ** -0.50 **
   Year t + 1 -0.46 0.49 -0.51 *** 0.28 -0.55 ** 0.25
   Year t + 2 0.43 0.71 ** -0.43 ** 0.22 -0.47 ** -0.12
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -2.02 *** -1.48 * -1.21 *** -0.87 *** -0.98 *** -0.55 **
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -1.80 *** -1.05 -0.91 *** 0.00 -0.90 *** -0.17
One-Sided Wald Tests: One Crisis vs. More than Once Crisis
Crisis Year -0.23 0.41 -0.59 *** -0.69 *** -0.42 * -0.31
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) 0.20 0.88 -0.26 ** 0.03 -0.31 ** -0.03
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes 80 80 107 107 126 126
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes 5 5 27 27 32 32
No. of Countries 39 39 26 26 38 38
No. of Observations 1300 1300 702 702 1050 1050
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.18
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD ) 
on a five-year window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Crisis events are split into one crisis episodes and more 
than one crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main text for details on how these indicators are constructed. Capital flows are first
normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. One-sided
Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at
the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.
COD
Table 7




















Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents
Portfolio Investments 2.13 2.84 0.58 1.34 0.06 0.62
   1980s 0.60 0.73 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
   1990s 2.25 1.79 0.48 1.02 0.02 0.15
   2000s 3.35 3.20 0.48 1.46 0.08 0.51
Other Investments 3.86 5.09 1.61 4.87 1.86 4.06
   1980s 2.94 3.01 0.25 3.36 3.19 3.19
   1990s 2.69 3.48 1.77 2.52 1.59 2.74
   2000s 5.98 7.27 1.98 3.36 0.90 2.22
Direct Investments 2.03 2.33 2.23 2.09 2.45 2.22
   1980s 0.64 0.56 0.42 0.38 0.67 0.38
   1990s 1.91 1.25 2.04 1.84 2.25 1.44
   2000s 3.65 2.79 3.12 2.01 3.81 1.98
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents
Portfolio Investments 2.26 3.22 0.25 0.79 0.05 0.22
   1980s 0.30 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   1990s 1.77 2.25 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.02
   2000s 4.15 3.47 0.52 0.84 0.09 0.30
Other Investments 2.62 3.56 1.07 2.74 0.87 1.73
   1980s 1.58 1.95 0.95 1.53 0.35 0.53
   1990s 1.76 2.68 0.78 1.98 0.68 1.47
   2000s 4.53 4.71 2.25 2.96 1.01 2.17
Direct Investments 1.48 1.93 0.25 0.43 0.04 0.15
   1980s 0.40 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
   1990s 0.82 0.83 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.03
   2000s 3.07 2.72 0.45 0.58 0.09 0.15
International Reserves 0.77 2.26 1.33 2.78 1.31 2.97
   1980s 0.40 1.46 0.30 2.42 0.01 1.85
   1990s 0.57 2.42 1.32 2.36 1.43 2.31
   2000s 0.94 1.72 1.54 2.53 2.23 2.89
The table shows summary statistics of the components of capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents. The median values of
country averages and standard deviations of capital flows over trend GDP are reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Table 8
Components of Capital Flows: Summary Statistics
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
No. of Countries 39 26 38One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 -0.09 0.21 ** 0.54 *** -0.05 -0.32 ** 0.21 ** 0.08 0.43 *** 0.09
   Year t - 1 -0.16 0.33 ** 0.71 *** 0.06 -0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.53 *** 0.27 **
   Crisis Year -0.40 *** -0.05 0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.59 *** -0.33 *** -0.22 0.03
   Year t + 1 0.02 -0.28 ** -0.61 *** -0.30 *** 0.12 -0.38 *** -0.41 *** -0.61 *** -0.39 ***
   Year t + 2 0.14 -0.22 * -0.28 * -0.14 0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.38 *** -0.12
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.28 * -0.32 ** -0.56 *** -0.14 * 0.04 -0.67 *** -0.40 *** -0.70 *** -0.15 **
0.05 -0.45 *** -0.90 *** -0.20 ** 0.22 -0.44 *** -0.34 *** -0.88 *** -0.34 ***
More than One Crisis  Episodes
   Year t - 2 1.40 * 1.01 * 1.01 *** 1.24 1.13 0.10 0.92 ** 1.67 ** 0.81 *
   Year t - 1 0.49 * 0.25 2.00 -0.56 -0.12 0.54 2.25 ** 2.37 *** 1.59 *
   Crisis Year -1.05 -0.52 -0.15 0.31 ** 0.39 -0.45 -0.62 0.74 ** -0.12
   Year t + 1 0.02 -1.31 ** 0.05 0.22 1.03 * -0.26 -0.04 -0.26 0.13
   Year t + 2 0.28 -0.98 *** 0.54 * 0.92 0.16 0.22 -0.05 0.73 * 0.16
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -2.00 * -1.15 *** -1.66 *** -0.03 -0.12 -0.77 -2.21 ** -1.28 * -1.32
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -1.20 * -1.57 *** -1.36 *** 0.14 0.02 -0.48 -1.82 ** -1.62 ** -1.14 *
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes 77 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
No. of Countries 36 38 39 39 39 38 38 39 39
No. of Observations 1184 1251 1300 1300 1300 1250 1249 1300 1300
R-squared 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.06 0.3 0.34 0.21 0.37
Table 9.A
























The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for high-income countries on a five-
year window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent
to "Other Investments", and Reserves is equivalent to "International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into one crisis episodes and more than one crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main
text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard
deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-
level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.08 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.22 * 0.06 -0.07 0.20 ** 0.04
   Year t - 1 -0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.22 ** 0.25 ** -0.13 0.02 -0.04
   Crisis Year -0.41 *** -0.05 -0.22 -0.20 ** -0.46 *** -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.06
   Year t + 1 -0.02 0.08 -0.35 *** -0.33 *** -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.13
   Year t + 2 -0.20 * -0.13 -0.35 ** -0.19 ** -0.24 ** -0.13 0.14 -0.09 -0.20 **
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.39 *** -0.11 -0.38 *** -0.16 * -0.46 *** -0.24 ** 0.10 -0.19 * 0.06
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.19 ** -0.09 -0.46 *** -0.20 *** -0.24 ** -0.23 *** 0.16 -0.17 ** -0.09
More than One Crisis  Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.09
   Year t - 1 0.36 0.30 0.31 -0.07 -0.41 ** 0.09 -0.23 *** 0.04 0.09
   Crisis Year 0.06 -0.44 *** -0.84 *** -0.30 -1.00 *** -0.32 *** -0.33 -0.30 -0.23
   Year t + 1 0.12 -0.24 ** -0.42 ** -0.30 ** 0.32 -0.00 -0.09 0.21 -0.27 **
   Year t + 2 0.28 -0.22 -0.42 *** -0.19 0.38 ** -0.29 *** 0.54 *** -0.17 -0.20
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.14 -0.67 *** -1.10 *** -0.28 * -0.76 *** -0.37 ** -0.35 * -0.36 -0.32 **
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.04 -0.53 *** -0.82 *** -0.24 0.14 -0.25 0.03 -0.15 -0.32 ***
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes 94 98 107 107 109 98 100 107 98
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes 26 27 27 27 27 24 27 27 26
No. of Countries 22 23 26 26 26 23 24 26 23
No. of Observations 604 632 702 702 717 634 664 702 634
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.39 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.31
Table 9.B
























The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for high-income countries on a five-
year window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent
to "Other Investments", and Reserves is equivalent to "International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into one crisis episodes and more than one crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main
text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard
deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-
level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 -0.21 * 0.05 0.01 -0.15 ** 0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.02
   Year t - 1 0.08 -0.14 * 0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.01
   Crisis Year -0.14 * -0.20 -0.21 ** -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.02
   Year t + 1 0.06 -0.22 ** -0.20 ** -0.12 -0.07 -0.14 *** -0.12 0.31 *** -0.10
   Year t + 2 -0.05 -0.14 -0.21 ** -0.20 ** -0.10 -0.11 ** -0.07 -0.05 -0.16 **
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.08 -0.16 -0.24 ** 0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.03
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis 0.02 -0.14 * -0.24 ** -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.08
More than One Crisis  Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.41 * 0.59 * 0.33 * 0.23 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.16 0.00
   Year t - 1 0.22 0.51 ** 0.26 0.12 -0.42 ** -0.02 -0.23 ** 0.31 0.08
   Crisis Year -0.18 -0.08 -0.65 ** -0.04 -0.56 ** -0.01 -0.13 * -0.07 -0.03
   Year t + 1 -0.07 -0.25 -0.41 ** -0.24 0.16 0.15 -0.15 0.20 -0.08
   Year t + 2 0.05 -0.18 -0.35 ** -0.24 0.26 -0.08 -0.10 -0.57 *** -0.16
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.50 * -0.63 ** -0.95 *** -0.22 * -0.39 * 0.01 -0.04 -0.31 * -0.07
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.38 ** -0.72 *** -0.77 *** -0.35 ** 0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.38 *** -0.13
Country-Trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes 92 108 126 126 126 109 111 126 107
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes 24 29 32 32 32 29 27 32 26
No. of Countries 30 30 38 38 38 32 31 38 33
No. of Observations 821 853 1050 1050 1050 890 853 1050 889
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.25
Table 9.C
























The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for high-income countries on a five-
year window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent
to "Other Investments", and Reserves is equivalent to "International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into one crisis episodes and more than one crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main
text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard
deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-
level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.High-Income Countries Coverage Middle-Income Countries (contd.) Coverage
Australia 1970 - 2008 Libya 1977 - 2008
Austria 1970 - 2009 Lithuania 1993 - 2008
Bahamas, The 1976 - 2008 Malaysia 1974 - 2008
Barbados 1970 - 2007 Mauritius 1976 - 2008
Belgium-Luxembourg 1975 - 2008 Mexico 1979 - 2008
Canada 1970 - 2009 Panama 1977 - 2009
Cyprus 1976 - 2009 Poland 1985 - 2009
Czech Republic 1993 - 2008 Romania 1987 - 2009
Denmark 1975 - 2009 Russian Federation 1994 - 2009
Estonia 1992 - 2009 South Africa 1985 - 2009
Finland 1975 - 2009 Turkey 1974 - 2008
France 1975 - 2008 Uruguay 1978 - 2008
Germany 1971 - 2008 Venezuela, R.B. 1970 - 2009
Greece 1976 - 2008
Hong Kong 1998 - 2008
Hungary 1982 - 2008 Low-Income Countries Coverage
Iceland 1976 - 2009 Albania 1984 - 2008
Ireland 1974 - 2009 Algeria 1977 - 1991
Israel 1970 - 2009 Angola 1985 - 2008
Italy 1970 - 2009 Armenia 1993 - 2008
Japan 1977 - 2008 Azerbaijan, Rep. of 1995 - 2008
Korea, Rep. 1976 - 2009 Bolivia 1976 - 2008
Kuwait 1975 - 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 - 2008
Malta 1971 - 2008 China, P.R.: Mainland 1982 - 2008
Netherlands 1970 - 2009 Colombia 1970 - 2008
New Zealand 1972 - 2008 Congo, Republic of 1978 - 2007
Norway 1975 - 2008 Dominican Republic 1970 - 2008
Oman 1974 - 2008 Ecuador 1976 - 2008
Portugal 1975 - 2009 Egypt 1977 - 2008
Saudi Arabia 1971 - 2008 El Salvador 1976 - 2008
Singapore 1972 - 2008 Georgia 1997 - 2008
Slovak Republic 1993 - 2008 Guatemala 1977 - 2008
Slovenia 1992 - 2008 Honduras 1974 - 2008
Spain 1975 - 2009 India 1975 - 2008
Sweden 1970 - 2008 Indonesia 1981 - 2009
Switzerland 1977 - 2009 Jamaica 1976 - 2008
Trinidad and Tobago 1975 - 2007 Jordan 1972 - 2008
United Kingdom 1970 - 2009 Macedonia 1996 - 2008
United States 1970 - 2009 Moldova 1994 - 2009
Mongolia 1981 - 2006
Middle-Income Countries Coverage Morocco 1975 - 2008
Argentina 1976 - 2009 Namibia 1990 - 2008
Belarus 1993 - 2009 Nicaragua 1977 - 2008
Botswana 1975 - 2008 Pakistan 1976 - 2008
Brazil 1975 - 2009 Paraguay 1975 - 2009
Bulgaria 1980 - 2009 Peru 1977 - 2008
Chile 1975 - 2009 Philippines 1977 - 2008
Costa Rica 1977 - 2008 Sri Lanka 1975 - 2008
Croatia 1993 - 2008 Swaziland 1974 - 2007
Equatorial Guinea 1987 - 1996 Syrian Arab Republic 1977 - 2007
Gabon 1978 - 2005 Thailand 1975 - 2008
Iran, I.R. of 1976 - 2000 Tunisia 1976 - 2008
Kazakhstan 1995 - 2008 Ukraine 1994 - 2009
Latvia 1992 - 2009 Vietnam 1996 - 2008
Appendix Table 1
Sample CoverageHigh-Income Countries Crisis Dates Middle-Income Countries (contd.) Crisis Dates
Australia 1989 Libya 2002
Austria - Lithuania 1995
Bahamas, The - Malaysia 1985, 1997
Barbados - Mauritius 1981, 1996
Belgium-Luxembourg - Mexico 1981, 1985, 1994
Canada 1983 Panama 1983, 1987
Cyprus - Poland 1986, 1989
Czech Republic 1996 Romania 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999
Denmark 1987 Russian Federation 1995, 1998
Estonia 1992, 1998 South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993, 2001, 2008
Finland 1991 Turkey 1978, 1982, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2008
France 1994 Uruguay 1978, 1981, 1987, 2002
Germany 1976 Venezuela, R.B. 1976, 1982, 1989, 1993, 2002
Greece 1983, 1991
Hong Kong 1998
Hungary 1991 Low-Income Countries Crisis Dates
Iceland 1978, 1985, 1989, 1993, 2008 Albania 1990, 1997
Ireland - Algeria 1988
Israel 1975, 1985 Angola 1985, 1988, 1991, 1996
Italy 1981, 1990 Armenia 1994
Japan 1992, 1997 Azerbaijan, Rep. of 1995
Korea, Rep. 1980, 1983, 1997, 2008 Bolivia 1980, 1985, 1994, 1999
Kuwait 1980, 1990 Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Malta - China, P.R.: Mainland 1984, 1990, 1998
Netherlands - Colombia 1982, 1985, 1998
New Zealand 1984, 1987, 2008 Congo, Republic of 1983, 1986, 1991
Norway 1987, 1990 Dominican Republic 1975, 1982, 1985, 1990, 2003
Oman - Ecuador 1980, 1996, 2008
Portugal 1982 Egypt 1979, 1984, 1989, 2003
Saudi Arabia - El Salvador 1981, 1986, 1989, 1998
Singapore 1982 Georgia 1998
Slovak Republic 1998 Guatemala 1986, 1989, 2001, 2006
Slovenia 1992 Honduras 1981, 1990, 1999
Spain 1977, 1983 India 1991
Sweden 1991 Indonesia 1983, 1986, 1992, 1997
Switzerland - Jamaica 1978, 1981, 1987, 1991
Trinidad and Tobago 1982, 1985, 1993 Jordan 1988
United Kingdom 1974, 1980, 1984, 1991, 1995, 2007 Macedonia 1997
United States 1984, 1988, 2007 Moldova 1998, 2002
Mongolia 1990, 1993, 1996
Middle-Income Countries Crisis Dates Morocco 1980, 1986
Argentina 1980, 1985, 1995, 2001 Namibia 2001, 2008
Belarus 1994, 1999 Nicaragua 1979, 1985, 1990, 2000
Botswana 1984, 1994, 2001 Pakistan 1981, 1998
Brazil 1976, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2002, 2008 Paraguay 1982, 1989, 1995, 2001
Bulgaria 1990, 1993, 1996 Peru 1978, 1988, 1999
Chile 1975, 1980 Philippines 1981, 1997
Costa Rica 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994 Sri Lanka 1977, 1981, 1989, 1996
Croatia 1993, 1996 Swaziland 1984, 1995, 2001
Equatorial Guinea 1994 Syrian Arab Republic 1988
Gabon 1986, 1994, 1999, 2002 Thailand 1983, 1996
Iran, I.R. of 1978, 1985, 1992, 2000 Tunisia 1980, 1991
Kazakhstan 1999 Ukraine 1997, 2008
Latvia 1992, 1995 Vietnam 1997
Appendix Table 2
Crisis Dates